

1695. after de Denonville's expedition against the Senecas, justifies sufficiently all I say, and shows us that the destruction of an Iroquois village is not the way to deliver us from their incursions.

The easiest and least expensive means to succeed, is to continue to harass and annoy them so, by constant war parties, that they will not dare to leave their own towns. This the restoration of Fort Frontenac will enable us to do. If his Majesty resolves to attack Fort Pemkuit next year, it will give a new impulse to the boldness of the Indians of those parts. . . . It would even be desirable that he should extend that expedition so as to bombard Boston and Manhattan, which is not, in my opinion, very difficult; this would at a single stroke enable us to put an end to the war in this country."<sup>1</sup>

It would not have been impossible to answer a part, at least, of the Count de Frontenac's allegations in justification of his enterprise; yet it is true that it was not easy to decide whether this design had most drawbacks or advantages; both of which were exaggerated by the different parties; for if there was obstinacy, or, if you will, private interest in the motives, which impelled the Governor-General to act, the zeal of some of his opponents does not seem exempt from pique and prejudice; it was his misfortune that too many people shared the discontent.

However, no one can refuse to the Chevalier de Crisay the justice of saying that in carrying out the orders he received from his general, he displayed a conduct which won for him commendation even from those most hostile to the expedition committed to him. In a fortnight he advanced one hundred and twenty leagues through almost continual rapids, and rebuilt Fort Catarocouy. Nor did his zeal and vigilance halt here; before returning to Montreal, he sent out as scouts, eighty Indians divided into small squads, and to this precaution, it may be said, as much as

<sup>1</sup> This despatch is not in the N. Y. Col. Doc., or Canada Documents.